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Abstract
The problem of cache enabled private information retrieval (PIR) is considered in which a
user wishes to privately retrieve one out of K messages, each of size L bits from N distributed
databases. The user has a local cache of storage SL bits which can be used to store any
function of the K messages. The main contribution of this work is the exact characterization of
the capacity of cache enabled PIR as a function of the storage parameter S. In particular, for a
given cache storage parameter S, the information-theoretically optimal download cost D∗(S)/L
(or the inverse of capacity) is shown to be equal to (1− S
K
)
(
1 + 1
N
+ . . .+ 1
NK−1
)
. Special cases
of this result correspond to the settings when S = 0, for which the optimal download cost was
shown by Sun and Jafar to be
(
1 + 1
N
+ . . .+ 1
NK−1
)
, and the case when S = K, i.e., cache
size is large enough to store all messages locally, for which the optimal download cost is 0.
The intermediate points S ∈ (0,K) can be readily achieved through a simple memory-sharing
based PIR scheme. The key technical contribution of this work is the converse, i.e., a lower
bound on the download cost as a function of storage S which shows that memory sharing is
information-theoretically optimal.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) refers to the problem where a user wants to efficiently retrieve
one message out of K messages from N databases with each database storing all of the K messages
(i.e. all of the N databases are duplicates of each other) without revealing anything about the
identity of the desired message. Successful PIR must satisfy two properties: first, each of the N
message queries respectively sent from the user to each of the N databases must reveal nothing
about the identity of the message being requested; and second, the user must be able to correctly
decode the message of interest from the answers received from the N databases. The sum of all
responses from the databases to the user are considered to constitute the download communication
cost. While a trivial solution is to retrieve all the messages completely, this is clearly inefficient,
and the goal of PIR is to achieve the goal in an efficient manner. Since the introduction of PIR
in [1], this problem has received significant attention in the computer science community [2–5].
This work was supported in part by the NSF Grant CAREER-1651492.
In a recent interesting work [6], Sun and Jafar characterized the exact information-theoretic
capacity (or the inverse of download cost) of the (N,K) PIR problem as (1+1/N + . . . 1/NK−1)−1,
improving upon the previous best known achievable rate for the PIR problem [7].
Since the appearance of [6], significant progress has been made on a variety of variations of the
basic PIR problem. We briefly describe some of these advances next. The case of T -colluding PIR
(or TPIR in short) was investigated in [8], where any T databases out of N are able to collude, i.e.,
they can share the queries. Robust PIR, in which any N out of M databases (with N ≤M) fail to
respond was also investigated in [8], for which the capacity is found to be the same as that of TPIR.
In a recent work, [9] characterized the capacity of PIR with byzantine databases (or BPIR), i.e., a
scenario in which any L out of N databases are adversarial (i.e. they can respond with incorrect bits
after receiving the query). The above previous works assumed the presence of replicated databases,
i.e., each database stores all the K messages. The capacity of PIR with databases storing MDS
coded messages was considered in [10] and the capacity was subsequently characterized by Banawan
and Ulukus in [11]. This setting was further investigated for the scenario where any T out of N
databases can collude, an aspect termed MDS-TPIR [12, 13] although its capacity remains open
for general set of parameters. The problem of symmetric PIR (SPIR) was studied in [14]. In this
setting, privacy is enforced in both directions: i.e., user must be able to retrieve the message of
interest privately while at the same time the databases must avoid any information leakage to the
user about the remaining messages. The exact capacities for this symmetric PIR problem both
for non-coded (SPIR) and MDS-coded (MDS-SPIR) messages were characterized in [14, 15]. The
case of multi-message PIR (MPIR) was investigated in [16,17], in which the user wants to privately
retrieve P ≥ 1 out of K messages.
Contribution of this work– The focus of this work is on cache aided PIR, a setting in which
the user has a local cache of size SL bits, where L is the size of each message. Since there are K
messages, the storage parameter S can take values in the range 0 ≤ S ≤ K. The main contribution
of this work is the characterization of the capacity of cache aided PIR as a function of the storage
parameter S. It is shown that the capacity, C∗(S) is given by
(
(1− S
K
)
(
1 + 1
N
+ . . .+ 1
NK−1
))−1
.
The achievability for an arbitrary storage parameter S follows by a simple memory-sharing argu-
ment (an equivalent of the idea of time-sharing used in obtaining rate-regions for various multi-user
networks) that utilize the optimal PIR schemes for extreme values of S, i.e., S = 0 [6], and S = K.
The novel aspect is the converse which provides a lower bound on the download cost (equivalently,
an upper bound on capacity), and shows that the simple memory sharing scheme is in fact optimal.
2 Cached Aided PIR: Problem Statement
We consider K independent messages W1,W2, . . . ,WK , each of size L bits, i.e.,
H(W1, . . . ,WK) = H(W1) + . . .+H(WK), (1)
H(W1) = . . . = H(WK) = L. (2)
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There are N distributed databases and every database stores all the messages (W1, . . . ,WK). In
PIR, the user private generates an index θ ∈ [K] and wishes to retrieve Wθ, which keeping the
index θ secret from all the databases.
In cache enabled PIR, the user is equipped with a local cache, denoted by a random variable
Z. The cached content Z can be any arbitrary function of the K messages (W1, . . . ,WK) and is of
size SL bits, i.e.,
H(Z|W1, . . . ,WK) = 0, (3)
H(Z) = SL, (4)
where the storage parameter S takes values in the range S ∈ [0,K], with S = 0 corresponding to
no storage, and S = K corresponding to the case of full storage (user can store all the K messages).
It is assumed that the databases know Z, i.e., which contents are cached by the user, and the cache
contents remain fixed over time.
Depending on the message θ = k being requested, the user generates N queries Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
N .
The user sends the query Q
[k]
n to the nth database and the nth database responds by an answer
A
[k]
n , which is a function of Q
[k]
n , and the data stored (i.e., W1,W2, . . . ,WK). Hence, we have
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W1,W2, . . . ,WK) = 0. (5)
Upon receiving the answers from all the N databases, and using its local cached contents Z, the user
must be able to reconstruct the desired message Wk with probability of error Pe. The probability
of error must approach zero as L→∞, i.e., as the message size approaches infinity. In other words,
through a simple application of Fano’s inequality, we must satisfy
H
(
Wk|Z,A
[k]
1 , . . . , A
[k]
N , Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
N
)
= o(L), (6)
where o(L) represents a function such that o(L)/L approaches zero as L approaches infinity.
To protect the privacy of the user’s requested message, the K strategies (corresponding to the
K possible messages) must be identically distributed from the perspective of each database, i.e.,
we must satisfy the following constraint ∀n ∈ [n],∀k ∈ [K]
(Q[1]n , A
[1]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z) ∼ (Q
[k]
n , A
[k]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z) (7)
We say that a pair (D,L) is achievable if there exists a cache enabled PIR scheme with a cache
encoding, querying, and decoding functions,which satisfies the correctness and privacy constraints.
The performance of a PIR scheme is characterized by the number of bits of desired information (L)
per downloaded bit. In particular, if D is the total number of downloaded bits, and L is the size of
the desired message, then the normalized downloaded cost is D/L. In other words, the PIR rate is
L/D. The goal of this work is to characterize the optimal normalized download cost as a function
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of the storage S, and is defined as
D∗(S) = min {D/L : (D,L) is achievable}. (8)
The optimal PIR rate (or the capacity) is the inverse of the normalized download cost
C∗(S) = max {L/D : (D,L) is achievable}. (9)
3 Main Results and Insights
We first state the following Lemma which shows that the optimal download cost D∗(S) (or the
inverse of capacity 1/C∗(S)) is a convex function of the storage parameter S.
Lemma 1 The optimal download cost D∗(S) is a convex function of S. In other words, for any
(S1, S2), and α ∈ [0, 1], the optimal download cost satisfies
D∗(αS1 + (1− α)S2) ≤ αD
∗(S1) + (1− α)D
∗(S2). (10)
Proof of Lemma 1– Let us consider two storage parameters S1, and S2, with optimal download
costs D∗(S1), and D
∗(S2) respectively using two PIR schemes, say Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. Let us
now consider a new storage point S = αS1 + (1 − α)S2, for which we can construct a PIR scheme
as follows: we take each message Wi and divide it into two independent parts Wi =
(
W
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i
)
,
where W
(1)
i is of size αL bits, and W
(2)
i is of size (1 − α)L bits. We apply PIR Scheme 1 on the
first part of all the messages (W
(1)
1 , . . . ,W
(1)
K ), and apply PIR Scheme 2 on the second part of
all the messages (W
(2)
1 , . . . ,W
(2)
K ). The cache storage necessary for PIR scheme 1 is αS1L bits,
and the download cost for this part of the message is αD∗(S1)L bits. Similarly, the cache storage
necessary for PIR scheme 2 is (1−α)S2L bits, and the download cost for this part of the message is
(1− α)D∗(S2)L bits. Therefore, by memory sharing between these two schemes (i.e., splitting the
messages and storage and implementing two PIR schemes on independent parts of the messages),
the total used cache storage is (αS1 + (1 − α)S2)L bits, and the total amount downloaded is
(αD∗(S1) + (1 − α)D
∗(S2))L bits. Since D
∗(αS1 + (1 − α)S2) by definition is optimal download
cost for storage (αS1+ (1−α)S2), it must be upper bounded by the download cost of the memory
sharing scheme. Hence, the following inequality follows
D∗(αS1 + (1− α)S2) ≤ αD
∗(S1) + (1− α)D
∗(S2), (11)
which proves the convexity of D∗(S).
Corollary 1 The optimal download cost D∗(S) is lower bounded as
D∗(S) ≤
(
1−
S
K
)(
1 +
1
N
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
. (12)
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Corollary 1 follows directly from Lemma 1 by noting that when S = 0, then the optimal down-
load cost is D∗(0) = (1 + 1/N + . . . + 1/NK−1) [6], and for S = K, the optimal download cost is
D∗(K) = 0. Any value S ∈ [0,K] can be written as S = α× 0 + (1− α)×K, i.e., α = (1− S/K).
Hence, by Lemma 1, we have D∗(S) ≤ (1− S/K)D∗(0) + (S/K)D∗(K) which proves Corollary 1.
We next state Theorem 1 which is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 The optimal normalized download cost D∗ of cache enabled PIR, with K messages
(each of size L bits), N databases, and a user with a normalized cache storage of S is given by
D∗(S) =
(
1−
S
K
)(
1 +
1
N
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
. (13)
Proof of Theorem 1– In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to prove the following lower bound
D∗(S) ≥
(
1−
S
K
)(
1 +
1
N
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
. (14)
To this end, we define Q
[1]
1:N = {Q
[1]
n , n ∈ [N ]}, as the set of all N queries for message 1, A
[1]
1:N =
{A
[1]
n , n ∈ [N ]}, as the set of all N answers for message 1, and start with the following sequence of
inequalities:
I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |Z,W1)
= I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N ,W1|Z)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z)
= I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |Z) + I(W2:K ;W1|Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N , Z)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z)
(a)
≤ I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |Z)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
= I(W2:K ;A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N )− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
= I(W2:K ;A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N )− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
= H(A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N )−H(A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K) + o(L)
≤ D −H(A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
≤ D −H(W1, A
[1]
1:N |Z,Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
= D −H(W1|Z,Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
(b)
= D −H(W1|Z,W2:K)− I(W2:K ;W1|Z) + o(L)
= D −H(W1|Z) + o(L), (15)
where (a) follows from the decodability constraint for the requested message W1 from the answers,
queries, and the local cache, i.e., (6), and (b) follows from (7).
Hence, from (15), we have
D + o(L) ≥ H(W1|Z) + I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |Z,W1). (16)
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In order to bound the second term in (16), we next state the following Lemma, whose proof follows
in a similar fashion as that in the work of Sun and Jafar [6].
Lemma 2
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
1:N , A
[k−1]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1) ≥
H(Wk|Z,W1:k−1)
N
+
I(Wk+1;K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k)
N
− o(L).
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix. Using Lemma 2 repeatedly on the second term in
(16), we have the following bound on D
D + o(L) ≥ H(W1|Z) +
H(W2|Z,W1)
N
+
H(W3|Z,W1:2)
N2
+ · · ·+
H(WK |Z,W1:K−1)
NK−1
=
K∑
k=1
H(Wk|Z,W1, . . . ,Wk−1)
Nk−1
=
K∑
k=1
H(W1, . . . ,Wk|Z)−H(W1, . . . ,Wk−1|Z)
Nk−1
.
We next observe that the above bound followed a sequence of steps i.e., starting with querying
message 1, followed by 2, and up until message K. By following a different order (in particular, a
different sequence of applications of Lemma 2 for another ordering of messages), we can obtain the
following bound for any permutation (pi1, pi2, . . . , piK) of the message set (1, 2, . . . ,K).
D + o(L) ≥
K∑
k=1
H(Wpi1 , . . . ,Wpik |Z)−H(Wpi1 , . . . ,Wpik−1 |Z)
Nk−1
. (17)
As an example, consider the case of K = 3 messages and N databases. For this case, we have a
total of 3! = 6 bounds on D, given as follows:
D + o(L) ≥ H(W1|Z) +
H(W1,W2|Z)−H(W1|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W1,W2|Z)
N2
D + o(L) ≥ H(W1|Z) +
H(W1,W3|Z)−H(W1|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W1,W3|Z)
N2
D + o(L) ≥ H(W2|Z) +
H(W2,W1|Z)−H(W2|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W2,W1|Z)
N2
D + o(L) ≥ H(W2|Z) +
H(W2,W3|Z)−H(W2|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W2,W3|Z)
N2
D + o(L) ≥ H(W3|Z) +
H(W3,W1|Z)−H(W3|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W3,W1|Z)
N2
D + o(L) ≥ H(W3|Z) +
H(W3,W2|Z)−H(W3|Z)
N
+
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)−H(W3,W2|Z)
N2
.
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Summing up these 3! bounds, and dividing by 3!, we obtain
D + o(L)
≥
1
N0
(
(H(W1|Z) +H(W2|Z) +H(W3|Z))(3
1
)
)
+
1
N1
(
(H(W1,W2|Z) +H(W2,W3|Z) +H(W1,W3|Z))(3
2
) − (H(W1|Z) +H(W2|Z) +H(W3|Z)(3
1
)
)
+
1
N2
(
H(W1,W2,W3|Z)(3
3
) − (H(W1,W2|Z) +H(W2,W3|Z) +H(W1,W3|Z)(3
2
)
)
.
For the general case of K messages, we take all possible K! permutations of (17), sum up all the
K! bounds, and divide by K! to obtain the following lower bound on D:
D + o(L) ≥
K∑
k=1
1
Nk−1
(∑
S⊆[1:K]:|S|=kH(WS |Z)(
K
k
) −
∑
S⊆[1:K]:|S|=(k−1)H(WS |Z)(
K
k−1
)
)
. (18)
Before proceeding further, we next state the conditional version of Han’s inequality on the entropy
of subsets of random variables which plays a key role in obtaining the tight lower bound on D.
Han’s Inequality– Consider a set ofK random variables (W1,W2, . . . ,WK), and letWS denote
the subset WS = {Xi : i ∈ S}. Let
µk ,
1(
K
k
) ∑
S⊆[1:K]:|S|=k
H(WS |Z)
k
, (19)
then Han’s inequality [18] (Chapter 17, Theorem 17.6.1). states the following:
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . (20)
Using this notation (19) of µk in (18), we proceed to lower bound D as follows:
D + o(L) ≥
K∑
k=1
1
Nk−1
(∑
S∈[K]:|S|=kH(WS |Z)(
K
k
) −
∑
S∈[K]:|S|=(k−1)H(WS |Z)(
K
k−1
)
)
(a)
=
K∑
k=1
1
Nk−1
(kµk − (k − 1)µk−1)
= µ1 +
1
N
(2µ2 − µ1) +
1
N2
(3µ3 − 2µ2) +
1
N3
(4µ4 − 3µ3) + . . .+
1
NK−1
(KµK)
(b)
= µ1
(
1−
1
N
)
+ (2µ2)
(
1
N
−
1
N2
)
+ (3µ3)
(
1
N2
−
1
N3
)
. . .+KµK
(
1
NK−1
)
(c)
≥ µK
(
1−
1
N
)
+ (2µK)
(
1
N
−
1
N2
)
+ (3µK)
(
1
N2
−
1
N3
)
. . . +KµK
(
1
NK−1
)
= µK
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . .+
1
NK−1
)
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(d)
=
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK |Z)
K
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
=
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK , Z)−H(Z)
K
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
(e)
=
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK)−H(Z)
K
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
(f)
=
(KL− SL)
K
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . .+
1
NK−1
)
= L
(
1−
S
K
)(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . . +
1
NK−1
)
, (21)
where (a) follows by the definition of µk in (19), (b) follows by re-arranging and collecting the
coefficients of µk’s for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. The step (c) is the most critical one and that follows from
Han’s inequality (20), which states that µ1 ≥ µ2 . . . ≥ µK , and we lower bound each one of the µk’s
by µK . Step (d) follows from the fact that µK = H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK |Z)/K, and step (e) is due to
the fact that the cache content Z is a function of the messages, i.e., H(Z|W1,W2, . . . ,WK) = 0.
Finally, (f) follows from the cache storage constraint, i.e., H(Z) = SL, and the fact that the
messages are independent and each message has entropy L. Hence, from (21), we have the proof
for the lower bound
D
L
≥
(
1−
S
K
) K∑
k=1
1
Nk−1
−
o(L)
L
. (22)
Taking the limit L→∞, we have the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Conclusions and Discussion
In this work, we characterized the capacity of cache enabled private information retrieval (PIR)
and it was shown to be the inverse of (1 − S
K
)
(
1 + 1
N
+ . . .+ 1
NK−1
)
, as a function of (N,K) and
the storage parameter S. The key technical contribution of this work is the converse, i.e., a lower
bound on the download cost as a function of storage S which shows that a simple memory sharing
scheme is information-theoretically optimal. The new ingredient in the proof (in addition to those
in [6]) include an interesting use of Han’s inequality to bound the conditional entropies of subsets
of messages conditioned on the cache content Z. We would like to remark that for the cache aided
PIR problem considered in this work, it was assumed that the cached content Z is publically known,
i.e., it is revealed to all the databases.
As a future direction, an interesting variant of the problem could be dynamic cache aided PIR,
in which the cached content of the user is not revealed to the databases. By leveraging the unknown
cache, it is entirely possible to improve the capacity beyond memory sharing. However, in such a
scenario, once the unknown cache is used, the user would need to update/refresh its cached contents
(either through the databases themselves, or through some other trusted mechanism which keeps
the cached content essentially random from the perspective of each database). Thus, the total
download cost would comprise of two elements: the cost of retrieving the desired message, and the
cost of refreshing the cached contents for efficient PIR in the future. It would be interesting to see
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if one can improve upon memory sharing even after accounting for the total cost of download and
cache refreshment, and characterize this general tradeoff.
5 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, we start with the following sequence of inequalities
NI(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
1:N , A
[k−1]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1) ≥
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
n , A
[k−1]
n |Z,W1:k−1)
(7)
=
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k]
n , A
[k]
n |Z,W1:k−1)
≥
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;A
[k]
n |Z,W1:k−1, Q
[k]
n )
(5)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n |Z,W1:k−1, Q
[k]
n )
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n |Z,W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:n−1)
= I(Wk;K ;A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N )
(7)
= I(Wk;K;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1)
(6)
= I(Wk;K;Wk, Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1)− o(L)
= I(Wk;K ;Wk|Z,W1:k−1) + I(Wk;K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k)− o(L)
= H(Wk|Z,W1:k−1) + I(Wk+1;K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k)− o(L).
Hence, we have
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
1:N , A
[k−1]
1:N |Z,W1:k−1) ≥
H(Wk|Z,W1:k−1)
N
+
I(Wk+1;K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |Z,W1:k)
N
− o(L),
which completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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